Abstract. Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been included in the NESSIE block cipher portfolio and selected as a standard by ISO/IEC. In this work, we observe that there exist some interesting properties of the F L/F L −1 functions in Camellia. With this observation we derive some weak keys for the cipher, based on which we present the first known 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher of Camellia with F L/F L −1 layers. This result shows that the F L/F L −1 layers inserted in Camellia cannot resist zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis effectively for some weak keys since the currently best zero-correlation linear distinguisher for Camellia without F L/F L −1 layers also covers 8 rounds. Moreover, by using the novel distinguisher, we launch key recovery attacks on 13-round Camellia-192 and 14-round Camellia-256 respectively. To our knowledge, these results are the best for Camellia-192 and Camellia-256 with F L/F L −1 and whitening layers.
Introduction
The block cipher Camellia was jointly proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000 [1] . It was selected as one of the CRYPTREC e-government recommended ciphers in 2002 [2] and included in the NESSIE block cipher portfolio in 2003 [3] . Later in 2005, it was adopted as the international standard by ISO/IEC [4] . Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher which uses the Feistel structure with key-dependent functions F L/F L −1 inserted every six rounds. It supports three different key sizes: 128, 192 and 256, and the number of rounds changes according to the key size, i.e., 18 rounds for 128-bit key size (denoted as Camellia-128) and 24 rounds for 192/256-bit key sizes (denoted as Camellia-192/Camellia-256, respectively).
So far there have been many cryptanalytic results for reduced-round Camellia by using different approaches such as differential and linear cryptanalysis [5] , truncated differential cryptanalysis [6, 7] , integral attack [8] [9] [10] , meet-in-the-middle attack [11] , collision attack [9, 12] , impossible differential cryptanalysis [7, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] and zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis [20] . As a matter of fact, most attacks presented before 2011 excluded the F L/F L −1 and whitening layers to ease the cryptanalysis, while recent attacks aimed at reduced-round Camellia with F L/F L −1 and/or whitening layers. For example, in [13] , several 6-round impossible differentials of Camellia with F L/F L −1 layers were proposed, based on which some attacks -denotes the concatenation operation.
-· denotes bitwise inner product.
-∩, ∪ denote bitwise AND and OR operations, respectively.
-X denotes bitwise complement of X, where X ∈ F n 2 . -X ≪ m denotes left rotation of X by m bits. -X ≫ m denotes right rotation of X by m bits. -X L , X R denote the left and right halves of X, respectively.
Notations for key recovery attacks (i.e., notations used in Section 4): -P j , C j , K j denote the j-th bytes of plaintext P , ciphertext C and subkey K respectively, numbered from left to right. -P {j 1 ,j 2 } , C {j 1 ,j 2 } , K {j 1 ,j 2 } denote P j 1 P j 2 , C j 1 C j 2 and K j 1 K j 2 respectively. -P [j], C[j], K[j] denote the j-th bits of plaintext P , ciphertext C and subkey K respectively, numbered from left to right.
Fast Fourier Transform for Zero-Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis
We briefly recall the FFT-based technique of computational complexity reduction for zerocorrelation linear cryptanalysis which was described in [20] . The objective of this technique is to eliminate the redundant computations from the partial encryption/decryption in the course of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis.
Let Γ P → Γ D be a zero-correlation linear distinguisher for the first r − 1 rounds of an rround block cipher E K . After partial decryption of the last round, the linear distinguisher to be evaluated becomes:
, where f −1 (·) represents a partial decryption of the last round for the k bits of K and C that influence the value of Γ D · D.
Let x denote the plaintext-ciphertext bits involved in the linear distinguisher. Now we define the 2 k × 2 k matrix M as follows:
Then the bias of the linear distinguisher can be evaluated as the matrix-vector product M Z, where Z is the vector corresponds to the parity of Γ P · P and the number of occurrences of each possible value of x in all given plaintext-ciphertext pairs. As shown in [26] , the matrix M has a level-circulant structure resulting from the XOR between the ciphertext and the key guess, thus this matrix-vector product can be computed efficiently by using the Fast WalshHadamard Transform (equivalent to a k-dimensional Fast Fourier Transform) with about 3k × 2 k arithmetic operations. We refer to [20, 26] for more details of the FFT technique for improving the computational complexity in linear cryptanalysis. 
A Brief Description of Camellia
2 ) 8 denote the left and right halves of the input for the i-th round of Camellia, respectively. Then the i-th round transformation of Camellia can be described as:
where k i denotes the i-th round key, and the round function F consists of the round key addition, the nonlinear transformation S and the linear transformation P . There are four 8 × 8 S-boxes S 1 , S 2 , S 3 and S 4 adopted in S, and each S-box is used twice in the sequence (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 , S 1 ). The linear transformation P : (F 8 2 ) 8 → (F 8 2 ) 8 and its inverse P −1 are defined as follows: Fig. 2) , where K L , K R are defined as below:
-For Camellia-192, K L is set as the left 128-bit value of the master key K, and
All round keys, whitening keys and subkeys used in the F L/F L −1 layers can be generated from K L , K R , K A and K B (See Table 2 ). We refer to [1] for more details of Camellia. In this section, we will give some properties of F L −1 function, and similar results can be achieved for F L function. We refer to Fig. 1(b) for the definitions of F L/F L −1 functions.
Then the correlation of the F L −1 function is ±1 if following conditions are satisfied:
Otherwise, the correlation is 0. 
and left rotating a row vector γ ∈ F 32 2 by 1 bit can be characterized by
therefore,
where E 32 is the 32 × 32 identity matrix and 0 is the 1 × 32 zero vector.
, to make the correlation non-zero (i.e., ±1), the output mask should be
According to Property 1, we get the following:
be the input and output masks of the F L −1 function as defined in Property 1. Suppose that the correlation of the F L −1 function is nonzero (i.e., ±1), then u = v if and only if
8-round Zero-Correlation Linear Distinguisher under Weak Keys
By applying miss-in-the-middle technique, we find that
is an 8-round zero-correlation linear hull for Camellia under some weak keys (covering rounds 6-13, see Fig.3 ), where a, h ∈ F 8 2 denote any non-zero values, and the weak keys satisfy the following conditions:
This is actually the first known 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher of Camellia with F L/F L −1 layers. Next we will show that the above 8-round linear hull has correlation 0. According to the correlation matrices results presented in [27] , the correlation of a linear hull can be computed as a sum of key-dependent signed products of correlations of linear approximations that are chained over consecutive rounds. Thus for the weak keys satisfying Eq. (1), we will demonstrate that all 8-round linear trails (covering rounds 6-13) with input and output masks being ((a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) and ((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h)) have correlation 0, which indicates that the corresponding 8-round linear hull has correlation 0. The detailed explanation is given below:
-For the linear trails that the input and output masks of F L −1 function (Note that the F L function along the encryption direction is regarded as the F L −1 function along the decryption direction) are not equal, the correlations of these trails are 0 according to Property 2 given in Section 3.1 and Piling-up Lemma presented in [28] . a,a,0,0,a,0,a, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h) ), the mask after three rounds (i.e., (Γ X 11 L , Γ X 11 R )) must have the form ((g 1 ⊕h, 0, 0, g 4 ⊕h, g 5 , g 6 ⊕h, g 7 ⊕h, h), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, g) ) if the corresponding 3-round linear trail has non-zero correlation, where g, g 1 , g 4 , g 5 , g 6 , g 7 ∈ F 8 2 are unknown non-zero values.
• If the upper 3-round linear trail and the lower 3-round linear trail can build up an 8-round linear trail (covering rounds 6-13), then we have:
Moreover, Γ O 10
KS can be derived from Γ X 10 R . Actually, to make the correlation of the linear approximation of P transformation in round 10 non-zero (Otherwise, the correlation of the whole 8-round linear trail will be 0 according to Piling-up Lemma), Γ O 10 KS must have the form
• In order to make the correlation of the linear approximation Γ I 10 KS → Γ O 10 KS non-zero, we have that g 1 ⊕ g 4 ⊕ g 6 ⊕ g 7 = 0 and g 1 ⊕ g 4 ⊕ g 7 = 0.
This implies g 6 = 0, which contradicts the fact that g 6 is a non-zero value. Therefore, we can conclude that all 8-round linear trails (covering rounds 6-13) with input and output masks being ((a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a), (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) and ((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), (h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h)) have correlation 0 for the weak keys satisfying Eq. (1).
Zero-Correlation Linear Attacks on Camellia
Firstly, by setting (a, h) as (0x01, 0x01) and (0x01, 0x02) respectively in Section 3.2, we obtain two 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguishers of Camellia with F L/F L −1 layers under the weak keys satisfying the following 15-bit conditions:
Then based on these zero-correlation linear distinguishers, we can mount key recovery attacks on 13-round Camellia-192 and 14-round Camellia-256 with F L/F L −1 and whitening layers.
Attacking 13-round Camellia-192
Let E denote the 13-round Camellia-192 with the F L/F L −1 and whitening layers from the third round to the fifteenth round, and P = (P L , P R ), C = (C L , C R ) represent the plaintext and ciphertext of E respectively. In the following, we will illustrate the attack on E with the help of the above two 8-round zero-correlation linear hulls (See Fig. 4(a) ). Note that in Fig.  4(a) , the bytes denoted as ′ * ′ need to be computed while the bytes denoted as ′ 0 ′ do not require computation. Before we give the detailed description of our attack, some notations are introduced as follows. Let 14 and k e = k 4 w ⊕ k 15 . Then by using the equivalent subkeys k a , k b , k c , k d and k e instead of the round keys k 3 , k 4 , k 5 , k 14 and k 15 , we can remove the whitening layers. Moreover, let F i j denote the function which computes the j-th output byte of the i-th round function. Let θ, ξ denote P L P R,{1,2,6,7,8} C L,8 C R,{1,4,5,6,7} and k a k b {1,2,6,7,8} k d 8 k e {1,4,5,6,7} , respectively. After that, in order to take the full advantage of the FFT technique to reduce the time complexity, we rewrite the linear approximation (a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a) · X 6 L ⊕ (h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h) · X 14 R = 0 by doing partial encryption and decryption as shown below:
where
, θ j , ξ j represent the j-th bytes of θ, ξ (numbered from left to right), and
Actually, Eq. (3) has zero correlation if and only if the following equation
has zero correlation. Thus we will present a zero-correlation linear attack on E based on Eq. (4). The attack procedure is divided into two phases: Distillation and Analysis phase and Master Key Recovery phase.
Distillation and Analysis.
1. Collect all the 2 128 plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P, C) of E. [7] . Initialize two vectors T and T ′ , each consisting of 2 154 counters which correspond to all possible values of µ and ν, respectively. Then for each pair (P, C), extract the 154-bit values µ and ν, and increase the corresponding counters T µ and T ′ ν by 1, respectively. Master Key Recovery. According to [21] and the Wrong-Key Randomization Hypothesis given in [29] , for a wrong subkey candidate, the probability that the correlation of Eq. (4) is 0 can be estimated as
. Therefore, the probability that a wrong subkey candidate for ξ k c 5 can pass the test in Step 4 of Distillation and Analysis phase is approximately ( 1. In terms of Table 2 , the 160-bit subkey 4,5,6,7} and the 15 bits of kl 2 , kl 3 given in Eq. (2) are expressed in K L , K R , K A and K B as follows: 
2. According to Eq. (10) and (11), we can get five bits of (K R ≪ 30 ) R . Guess the other 59 bits of (K R ≪ 30 ) R , thus all the bits of (
,2,6,7,8} from Eq. (5) and (6) [20, 21, 28, 35, 36] according to Eq. (12) and (13), thus only 19 bits of (K L ) R are unknown. Now we guess these 19 bits of (K L ) R and compute K A , K B according to the key schedule. With Eq. (7), (8) and (9) we filter out 2 −56 wrong candidates of
Then we have 2 33.4 × 2 54 × 2 19 × 2 −56 = 2 50.4 key candidates K L (K R ) L (i.e., the master key) altogether. For each of the 2 50.4 key candidates, verify whether it is correct or not by using one plaintext-ciphertext pair. If not, remove the key candidate. It is expected that only the right key will be left.
Complexity of the Attack. The data complexity of this attack is 2 128 known plaintexts. The memory complexity is primarily owing to storing the vectors T , T ′ , Z and Z ′ in the Distillation and Analysis phase. Actually, the value of each counter in T is at most 2 128 /2 105 = 2 23 , thus the size of each counter in T can be estimated as 23 bits. Similarly, the size of each counter in T ′ , Z, Z ′ can be approximated as 23, 24, 24 bits respectively. Hence, the memory complexity of this attack can be measured as 2 × 2 154 × 23/8 + 2 × 2 152 × 24/8 ≈ 2 156.86 bytes. Regarding the time complexity of this attack, it is mainly dominated by the matrix-vector products M Z and M ′ Z ′ in Step 4 of the Distillation and Analysis phase, which can be derived as follows. For each possible value of k a 5 ⊕ k c 5 , the matrix-vector products M Z and M ′ Z ′ require 2 × 3 × 152 × 2 152 ≈ 2 161.83 arithmetic operations by applying the FFT technique described in Section 2.2. Accordingly, the time complexity of this attack can be measured as 2 8 × 2 161.83 = 2 169.83 13-round Camellia-192 encryptions (Assume that one arithmetic operation is equivalent to one 13-round Camellia-192 encryption).
Attacking 14-round Camellia-256
Let E ′ denote the 14-round Camellia-256 with the F L/F L −1 and whitening layers from the third round to the sixteenth round. Now we present a key recovery attack on E ′ by using the same two 8-round zero-correlation linear hulls as in Section 4.1 (See Fig. 4(b) ).
Let 14 , k e = k 3 w ⊕k 15 and k f = k 4 w ⊕k 16 . Moreover, let θ, ξ denote P L P R,{1,2,6,7,8} C L,{1,4,5,6,7} C R and k a k b {1,2,6,7,8} k e {1,4,5,6,7} k f , respectively. After that, in order to take the full advantage of the FFT technique to reduce the time complexity, we rewrite the linear approximation (a, a, 0, 0, a, 0, a, a) · X 6 L ⊕ (h, 0, 0, h, 0, h, h, h) · X 14 R = 0 by doing partial encryption and decryption as shown below:
where Then we can mount an attack on E ′ similarly to that on E given in Section 4.1. The data, memory and time complexities of this attack are about 2 128 known plaintexts, 2 212.86 bytes and 2 234.92 14-round Camellia-256 encryptions, respectively.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the security of Camellia by means of zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. Firstly, some new properties of the F L/F L −1 functions in Camellia have been proposed, following which we have observed some weak keys and constructed the first known 8-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher of Camellia with F L/F L −1 layers for these weak keys. Since this distinguisher covers the same number of rounds as the best known zero-correlation linear distinguisher for Camellia without F L/F L −1 layers, we claim that F L/F L −1 layers cannot thwart zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis effectively for some weak keys. Then by using this new distinguisher, we have presented key recovery attacks on 13-round Camellia-192 and 14-round Camellia-256 respectively. Note that our attacks work for weak keys with 15-bit conditions on kl 2 and kl 3 which are actually the 15-bit conditions on the master key, thus the advantages of these attacks over exhaustive search (measured in bits) are about 192 − 169.83 − 15 = 7.17 and 256 − 234.92 − 15 = 6.08 bits respectively. Although these results are the currently best for Camellia-192 and Camellia-256 with F L/F L −1 and whitening layers in terms of the number of attacked rounds, none of the attacks directly threatens the security of Camellia but they reduce the security margin of the cipher.
